A Variational EM Method for Mixed Membership Models with Multivariate
  Rank Data: an Analysis of Public Policy Preferences by Wang, Y. Samuel et al.
Submitted to the Annals of Applied Statistics
A VARIATIONAL EM METHOD FOR MIXED
MEMBERSHIP MODELS WITH MULTIVARIATE RANK
DATA: AN ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC POLICY
PREFERENCES
By Y. Samuel Wang, Ross L. Matsueda and Elena A. Erosheva
University of Washington
In this article, we consider modeling ranked responses from a
heterogeneous population. Specifically, we analyze data from the Eu-
robarometer 34.1 survey regarding public policy preferences towards
drugs, alcohol and AIDS. Such policy preferences are likely to exhibit
substantial differences within as well as across European nations re-
flecting a wide variety of cultures, political affiliations, ideological
perspectives and common practices. We use a mixed membership
model to account for multiple subgroups with differing preferences
and to allow each individual to possess partial membership in more
than one subgroup. Previous methods for fitting mixed membership
models to rank data in a univariate setting have utilized an MCMC
approach and do not estimate the relative frequency of each subgroup.
We propose a variational EM approach for fitting mixed membership
models with multivariate rank data. Our method allows for fast ap-
proximate inference and explicitly estimates the subgroup sizes. Ana-
lyzing the Eurobarometer 34.1 data, we find interpretable subgroups
which generally agree with the “left vs right” classification of political
ideologies.
1. Introduction. Rank data often arise from a heterogeneous popula-
tion with individuals whose preferences may vary widely. In this article, we
consider one such example, public health policy data from the Eurobarom-
eter 34.1. We develop a computationally efficient variational EM procedure
to estimate mixed membership models with rank data. In addition to the
computational aspects, we also extend the current literature by explicitly es-
timating the subgroup relative frequencies and accommodating multivariate
ranked data.
2. Public Policy Preferences. Social scientists have long held that
in democratic societies, public opinion plays an important role in the for-
mation of public policies about important social problems (e.g. Burstein,
Keywords and phrases: mixed membership, rank data, variational inference, euro-
barometer, public policy
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2 YS WANG, MATSUEDA AND EROSHEVA
1998; Brooks and Manza, 2008). Public opinion polls, which provide a win-
dow on the attitudes and perspectives of a nation’s citizenry, at times elicit
ranked data about specific public policies. An example is the Eurobarom-
eter 34.1, a survey commissioned in 1990 to study European perspectives
on various political and public health issues (Reif and Melich, 2001). The
Eurobarometer 34.1 collected data on a broad range of topics, using a range
of question formats, including measures of health behavior, knowledge of il-
legal drugs, descriptions of family structure, and attitudes toward children.
In particular, three of the survey questions, shown in Figure 1, asked about
public policy priorities toward addressing societal/public health problems.
Therefore, our analysis focuses on examining responses to these questions.
We should note that, if the survey contained other pertinent questions of
binary or multinomial responses, these data could have been included in the
analysis using the mixedMem R package (Wang and Erosheva, 2015; R Core
Team, 2016) which allows for multivariate analysis when the variables are
of different distributions.
The specific variables we consider address illicit drugs, alcoholism, and
AIDS. The survey respondents were asked to rank, in order of priority, poli-
cies such as punishment for offenders, information campaigns to educate the
public, rehabilitation and treatment, funding of research into causes and
treatment, and fighting social causes. Such priority rankings are likely to
vary across respondents within a nation, reflecting dissensus among a cit-
izenry, as well as across nations, reflecting national differences in culture,
political affiliation, ideological perspective, and common practices.
Table 1
The top 5 observed rankings for each question. The place in the permutation represents
the ranking level and the recorded number indicates the order in which the policy option
was presented in the questionnaire. See Figure 1, for the corresponding policies.
Drug Count
1,2,3,4,5,6,7 109
1,2,4,5,6,7,3 82
2,1,4,5,6,7,3 69
2,1,4,6,7,5,3 55
2,3,1,4,5,6,7 53
Alcohol Count
1,2,8,9,10 85
1,5,8,9,10 61
1,8,9,10,3 60
1,2,5,8,10 57
1,8,9,10,2 53
AIDS Count
1,5,4,2,3 740
5,4,1,2,3 722
5,1,4,2,3 670
1,5,4,3,2 604
1,4,5,2,3 515
The top 5 observed responses for each question, shown in Table 1, are sug-
gestive of significant population heterogeneity. For example, for illegal drugs,
a “legal penalty for drug taking” (policy 3) is highly ranked in the first and
fifth most observed permutations, but ranked last in the second, third and
fourth most observed permutations. This heterogeneity is not surprising be-
cause the individuals in the survey come from a wide variety of nationalities,
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Question 28: There are various actions that could be taken to eliminate the drugs problem. In your opinion, what
is the first priority? And the next most urgent? (Ask respondent to rank all 7, with 1 as the most urgent)
1. Information campaigns about the dangers of drugs
2. Hunting down drug pushers and distributors
3. Legal penalty for drug taking
4. Looking after and treating drug addicts and rehabilitating them
5. Funding research into drug substitutes, and into the treatment of drug addiction
6. Fighting the social causes of drug addiction
7. Reinforcing the control or distribution and usage of addictive medicines
Question 39: There are various actions that could be taken in order to ease the problem of alcoholism and its
consequences. Looking at this card, which is the main priority in your view? and the next? (Rank up to 5)
1. Information campaigns about the danger of alcoholism
2. Stiffer penalties for offenses committed under the influence of alcohol
3. Banning advertising for alcoholic drinks
4. Increasing taxes on alcohol
5. Restricting the sale of alcohol. Especially to young people
6. Putting lower legal limits on alcohol content
7. Making social outcasts of alcoholics
8. Helping alcoholics to submit “drying out”
9. Funding medical research to develop more effective treatments
10. Setting up more reception centers, drying out treatment centers
Question 47: There are various actions that could be taken in order to eliminate the problem of AIDS or at least
to slow down its development. Looking at this card, which is the main priority in your view? And the next? (Rank
all by giving a number from 1 to 5. with 1 as a top priority)
1. Information campaign about the danger
2. Punishment for behavior which increases the risk
3. Identifying and isolating those with AIDS or those who are HIV positive
4. Treating of those with AIDS and looking after them
5. Funding research to find a vaccine
Fig 1. The three questions of interest from Eurobarometer 34.1 regarding illegal drugs,
alcoholism, and AIDS. The survey was administered in Belgium, Denmark, East Germany,
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK, and
West Germany. Further demographic information is given in Table 2.
religious backgrounds and age groups (shown in Table 2). In analyzing such
heterogeneity, an important question is whether there are underlying sub-
groups or policy profiles among citizens. For example, when asked how they
prioritize policies about the problem of illegal drugs, do citizens form a single
group that varies along a dimension of punishment to rehabilitation, which
reflects a conservative-liberal continuum? Or do responses reflect subgroups
of citizens, in which some favor punitive measures, others rehabilitation,
and still others education? Do some subgroups systematically oppose some
policy measures, while favoring others? Moreover, given such subgroups,
are some citizens members of multiple groups, favoring, for example, both
rehabilitation and information? In modern democracies characterized by a
diverse citizenry, such subgroups may be likely to exist. Failure to consider
such subgroups, when they in fact exist, may lead to a distorted view of a
nation’s public. Appropriately modeling the population heterogeneity may
be particularly important when the questions cover a wide range of topics,
as they do here.
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Table 2
Demographic breakdown of Eurobarometer 34.1 participants
Nation Count Nation Count Nation Count
Belgium 812 Greece 980 Northern Ireland 267
Denmark 950 Ireland 879 Portugal 978
East Germany 938 Italy 1048 Spain 864
France 967 Luxembourg 242 West Germany 975
Great Britain 956 Netherlands 1016
Religion Count Religion Count
Buddhist 11 Orthodox 1057
Hindu 2 Other 162
Jewish 20 Protestant 2182
Muslim 23 Roman Catholic 5617
None 2692
Age Group Count
15-24 Years 2401
25-39 Years 3489
40-54 Years 2780
55+ Years 3202
3. Mixed Membership Models.
3.1. Previous Work. Many approaches for modeling rank data have been
proposed; for a review, see Marden (1995). In this paper, we focus on the
Plackett-Luce model due to several attractive attributes (discussed fur-
ther in Section 4). Assuming population homogeneity, Hunter (2004) de-
velop a minorization-maximization method for estimating MLEs for a sin-
gle Plackett-Luce distribution, and Guiver and Snelson (2009) present a
Bayesian framework for estimation.
Most of the previous work that address heterogeneity in rank data con-
sider the univariate case and specify a mixture model. Gormley and Murphy
(2006) assume a mixture of Plackett-Luce distributions, while Busse, Orbanz
and Buhmann (2007) assume a mixture of Mallow’s distributions. In addi-
tion, Bayesian non-parametric approaches have been used to allow for an
infinite number of latent subgroups (Meila and Chen, 2010) and an infinite
set of alternatives (Caron, Teh and Murphy, 2014). Gormley and Murphy
(2008) propose a mixture of experts model where individual level covariates
specify the probability that an individual belongs to a specific subgroup.
However, each of these mixture model approaches assume that every indi-
vidual always expresses preferences consistent with only a single subgroup.
In many cases this may be overly restrictive.
Gormley and Murphy (2009) propose a mixed membership model for uni-
variate rank data which allows for intra-subgroup mixing between ranking
levels. Mixed membership models extend mixture models by allowing an
individual membership to be split among multiple subgroups (e.g. Airoldi
et al., 2015). As Gross and Manrique-Vallier (2015, pg 128) point out, the
structure of a mixed membership model is consistent with Zaller’s (1992)
model of responses to public opinion polls, in which “respondents randomly
sample from a number of privately held ‘considerations’ relevant to the ques-
tion at hand.” Gross and Manrique-Vallier (2015) analyzed data on political
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ideology, examining core beliefs and values, finding that mixed membership
models reveal hidden structures in political ideologies that previous factor
analytic results missed.
Direct maximum likelihood estimation of mixed membership models is
generally intractable, so MCMC or approximate inference techniques are
used. In particular, Gormley and Murphy (2009) develop a Metropolis-
within-Gibbs sampler. Although the MCMC method allows for direct sam-
pling from the posterior, it scales poorly. Because of the individual level
parameters, the total number of parameters is directly proportional to sam-
ple size and the number of variables, which can result in slow mixing even
for moderate sample sizes. MCMC methods can also require a considerable
amount of human effort since convergence diagnostics must be checked for
all parameters (Gill, 2008).
3.2. Contribution of this work. In this article, we propose a variational
EM approach which scales well with the number of observed individuals and
is capable of tractably estimating mixed membership models for rank data
with a much larger sample size than can be handled by existing MCMC
methods. Variational inference has been used as an alternative estimation
procedure in mixed membership models where MCMC methods would be
computationally infeasible (Blei, Ng and Jordan, 2003; Erosheva, Fienberg
and Lafferty, 2004; Airoldi et al., 2008) and has been shown empirically to
provide results similar to MCMC in some cases (Erosheva, Fienberg and
Joutard, 2007). A direct computational comparison between the proposed
variational method and the MCMC method detailed by Gormley and Mur-
phy (2009) is provided in the supplement (Wang and Erosheva, 2016).
Motivated by Eurobarometer data on public policy priorities, we extend
the method of Gormley and Murphy (2009) to allow for multivariate data
and directly estimate the relative frequencies of each subgroup. The direct
estimation of the subgroup relative frequencies can be viewed as an empir-
ical Bayes type procedure or robust modeling practice and has been shown
to improve predictive performance in many cases (Wang and Blei, 2015).
Indeed, we show in the supplement that direct estimation of the subgroup
relative frequencies drastically improves the goodness-of-fit for exit poll data
gathered during the 1997 Irish Presidential Election (Wang and Erosheva,
2016). Finally, informed by exploratory data analyses, we extend the model
specification to include two pre-specified subgroups.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. We introduce the
Plackett-Luce distribution in Section 4 and the mixed membership rank data
model in Section 5. In Section 6, we review the variational approximation
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framework and detail the variational EM algorithm. Finally, we use the
proposed method to analyze public policy priorities from the Eurobarometer
34.1 survey in Section 7 and conclude with discussion in Section 8.
4. Modeling Rank Data. First, we consider univariate rank data.
Suppose there are V alternatives in the choice set (items to be ranked). For
each individual i, a single observation Xi is a permutation of Ni ≤ V of the
alternatives in the choice set. Each alternative v ∈ V (in this context, alter-
natives correspond to policies) is assigned a non-negative support parameter
θv which governs how strongly it is preferred to other alternatives (Plackett,
1975). The support parameters sum to 1 for identifiability. At each ranking
level, one of the remaining alternatives is selected with probability propor-
tional to its support parameter. The mass function for the Plackett-Luce
model is defined as
(1) P (Xi) =
Ni∏
n=1
θa(n)i
1−∑n−1c=0 θa(c)i ,
where a(n)i indicates the alternative selected at the n
th ranking level, and
θa(0) = 0. The Plackett-Luce selection process can be thought of as a multi-
nomial without replacement, and the support parameters represent the prob-
ability of a policy being selected as the top priority.
Although there are various distributions for modeling rank data, the
Plackett-Luce model has several attractive properties. First, it can accom-
modate incomplete rankings when not all alternatives in the choice set are
selected. Assuming unranked policies are less preferred than ranked policies,
the mass function in Equation 1 has marginalized out any unranked poli-
cies. Second, the model satisfies Luce’s Choice Axiom (Luce, 1977) which
states that an individual’s relative preference between alternatives v and v′
should not change when a third alternative v′′ is introduced (Sen, 2014).
Finally, the parameter space of the Plackett-Luce model is a continuous set
in the V − 1 simplex, while the parameter space of other popular models
(notably Mallow’s model) may be discrete sets which can greatly complicate
inference.
5. Generative Model: Multivariate Rank Data. We propose the
following generative model for multivariate rank data. Assuming K latent
subgroups, Dirichlet membership parameter α ∈ RK>0, J variables each with
Vj alternatives, and a set of support parameters θjk for each variable j and
subgroup k where
∑
v θjkv = 1, the generative mixed membership model is:
1. For each individual i = 1, 2 . . . T
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1. Draw a membership vector λi ∼ Dirichlet(α).
2. For each variable j = 1, 2 . . . J and for each ranking level n = 1, 2, . . . Nij
(a) Draw a context indicator Zijn ∼ multinomial(1,λi).
(b) Draw a policy priority Xijn ∼ Plackett-Luce(θ, Zijn|{Xijc}c<n).
where Plackett-Luce(θ, Zijn|{Xijc}c<n) denotes that Xijn is dependent on
Xijc for c < n since the alternatives selected at a prior ranking levels can-
not be selected again. The corresponding complete data likelihood and the
graphical representation are shown in Equation 2 and in Figure 2.
(2)
P (X,Λ, Z|α, θ) =
T∏
i
Dir(λi|α)
J∏
j
Nij∏
n
mult(Zijn|λi) K∏
k
[
θjka(n)ij
1−∑n−1c=0 θjka(c)ij
]Zijnk
Fig 2. Plate notation of the Multivariate Mixed Membership Rank Data Model. Quantities
λ, Z and X are specific to individuals while quantities α and θ are global.
In the model, λik denotes the degree of membership of individual i within
subgroup k, and in the Eurobarometer context, λik indicates an individual’s
level of adherence to a policy ideology. Zijn is the subgroup governing in-
dividual’s i selection for variable j at ranking level n. Note that the model
assumes mixing of subgroup preferences occur both between different vari-
ables and within a single observed ranking. Thus, an individual may select
their top choice according to the preferences of one subgroup, but select
their second choice according to the preferences of another subgroup. We
note that, conditional on the membership λi, there is no further dependence
enforced on each Zijn across the ranking levels of a single variable. Although
the Zijn are exchangeable in the generative model, in the posterior condi-
tioned on the observations, the context indicators are no longer exchangeable
because of the assumed sequential nature of the ranking procedure.
6. Variational EM Approach.
6.1. Variational Approximation. Calculating the marginal probability
P (X|α, θ) = ∫Z,Λ P (X,Λ, Z|θ, α) requires marginalizing over the simplicial
membership vectors Λ and context indicators Z. Because this calculation is
intractable, we use a mean-field variational method which approximates the
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true posterior for latent variables Λ and Z. A detailed tutorial of variational
inference is provided by Wainwright and Jordan (2008).
The variational distribution is
(3) Q(Z,Λ|φ, δ) =
T∏
i
Dir (λi|φi) J∏
j
Nij∏
n
mult (Zijn|δijn)

with variational parameters φ and δ (φi ∈ RK>0 and δijn lies in the K − 1
dimension simplex). Because it factors easily into functions of the varia-
tional parameters, this approximation facilitates tractable computation via
the Variational EM algorithm. We first derive a lower bound on the marginal
distribution of the observed rankings using Jensen’s inequality.
(4)
log [p(X|α, θ)] = log
[∫
Λ,Z
Q(Z,Λ|φ, δ)
Q(Z,Λ|φ, δ)P (X,Z,Λ|α, θ)
]
= logEQ
[
P (X,Z,Λ|α, θ)
Q(Z,Λ|φ, δ)
]
≥ EQ {log [P (X,Z,Λ|α, θ)]} − EQ {log [Q(Z,Λ|φ, δ)]}
The last line in Equation 4 is often called the Evidence Lower Bound
(ELBO) and is a function of the data, the variational parameters, φ and
δ, as well as the global parameters α and θ. It can be shown that maximiz-
ing the ELBO with respect to the variational parameters φ and δ minimizes
the KL-divergence between the true posterior and the variational distribu-
tion. In addition, fixing the variational parameters and maximizing the lower
bound with respect to α and θ can be used as a surrogate procedure for se-
lecting maximum likelihood estimates for α and θ (Beal, 2003). Ultimately,
by maximizing the lower bound (the ELBO), we simultaneously find pseudo-
MLE estimates for α and θ and an approximate posterior distribution for the
latent membership and context variables Λ and Z. This is accomplished by
iterating between E-steps and M-steps as shown in Algorithm 1. The lower
bound is given in Equation 5, but the derivation is left for the appendix.
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(5)
ELBO =
T∑
i
log
[
Γ
(
K∑
k
αk
)]
−
T∑
i
K∑
k
log [Γ(αk)] +
T∑
i
K∑
k
{
(αk − 1)
[
Ψ(φik)−Ψ
(
K∑
k′
φik′
)]}
+
T∑
i
J∑
j
Nij∑
n
{
K∑
k
δijnk
[
Ψ(φik)−Ψ
(
K∑
k′
φik′
)]}
+
T∑
i
J∑
j
Nij∑
n
K∑
k
δijkn
{[
log
[
θjka(n)ij
]]
− log
[
1−
n−1∑
c=0
θjka(c)ij
]}
−
T∑
i
log
[
Γ
(
K∑
k
φik
)]
+
T∑
i
K∑
k
log [Γ (φik)]
−
T∑
i
K∑
k
[
(φik − 1)
[
Ψ(φik)−Ψ
(
K∑
k′
φik′
)]]
−
T∑
i
J∑
j
Nij∑
n
K∑
k
δijnk log
[
δijnk
]
,
Γ(·) denotes the gamma function; Ψ(·) denotes the digamma function, the
derivative of log Γ(·).
Algorithm 1 Variational EM for Mixed Membership Rank Data
1: Initialize θ(0), α(0), K, φ(0) = 1
K
, δ(0) = 1
K
2: while (Convergence criterion not yet satisfied) do
3: while (Convergence criterion not yet satisfied) do . E - Step
4: Update δijnk
5: Update φik
6: end while
7: while (Convergence criterion not yet satisfied) do . M-Step
8: Update α by Newton-Raphson
9: Update θ by interior point method
10: end while
11: end while
6.2. E-Step: Update φ and δ. The E-step maximizes the lower bound
with respect to the individual level parameters φ and δ. Taking the derivative
of the lower bound yields the following updates for φ and δ:
(6)
δ
(s+1)
ijnk ∝ exp
(
Ψ(φ
(s)
ik )−Ψ
(
K∑
k′
φ
(s)
ik′
)
+ log
[
θjka(n)ij
]− log [1− n−1∑
c=0
θjka(c)ij
])
φ(s+1) = αk +
J∑
j
Nij∑
n
δ
(s+1)
ijnk
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where δ (a multinomial parameter) is normalized to sum to 1. We continue
updating each parameter in a coordinate ascent procedure until the relative
increase in the ELBO is below a specified tolerance.
6.3. M-Step: Update α and θ. The M-Step, described in Algorithm 2,
fixes the variational parameters φ and δ, and selects α, the Dirichlet param-
eter for the membership vectors, and θ, the Plackett-Luce support parame-
ters, to maximize the lower bound on the marginal log-likelihood. For both
parameters, there are no closed form solutions so we use iterative updates.
For α, we use a Newton-Raphson method to maximize the lower bound.
(7)
∂ELBO
∂αk
= T
(
Ψ
(
K∑
k′
αk′
)
−Ψ(αk)
)
+
T∑
i
(
Ψ(φik)−Ψ
(
K∑
k′
φik′
))
∂ELBO
∂αki∂αkj
= −T
(
1{i=j}Ψ
′(αki)−Ψ′
(∑
k′
αk′
))
.
Since θ is subject to the following constraints
∑Vj
v θjkv = 1 and θjkv ≥ 0
for v = 1, . . . , Vj , we use an interior point method to select an optimal θ
(Nocedal and Wright, 1999). Because the constraints are only enforced on
Algorithm 2 M-step update for θ: interior point method
Require: b0 > 0, M ∈ Z+, θ(0)
1: for j ∈ [J ] do
2: for k ∈ [K] do
3: for m ∈ [M ] do
4: while (Convergence criterion not yet satisfied) do
5: Calculate step direction ∆θjk using penalty term Bbm0 (θjk)
6: Use backtracking line search to determine step length τ
7: Set θ
(t+1)
jk = θ
(t)
jk + τ∆θjk
8: end while
9: end for
10: end for
11: end for
each individual set {θjkv}v=1:Vj and the objective function separates into
additive terms (with respect to the θjk), we can select θjk for each {j, k}
separately by solving the minimization problem:
(8) min
θjk
− ELBO(θjk) +B (θjk) subject to
Vj∑
v
θjkv = 1
where B(θ) = ∞∑Vv 1[θjkv<0] (i.e., the non-negativity constraint on θ has
been converted into a penalty term which assigns infinite loss to infeasible
imsart-aoas ver. 2014/10/16 file: varRank_vArx.tex date: February 27, 2017
MIXED MEMBERSHIP MODELS FOR RANK DATA 11
points). Because B is not a smooth function of θ, we approximate it with the
smooth function Bb =
−1
b
∑Vj
v log [θjkv] and solve the relaxed minimization
problem instead.
For notational ease, we use Φjk(θjk) to denote the objective function; H
denotes Hessian of Φjk; g denotes the gradient of Φjk and 1 denotes a row
vector of 1’s with length Vj .
(9)
∂Φjk(θ)
∂θjkv1
= −
T∑
i
Nij∑
n
δijnk
[
1{Xijn=v1}
θjkv1
+
∑n−1
c=1 1{Xijc=v1}
1−∑n−1c=0 θjva(c)ij
]
− 1
bθjkv1
∂2∂Φjk(θ)
∂θjkv2∂θjkv1
= −
T∑
i
Nij∑
n
δijnk
∑n−1c=1 1{Xijc=v1}∑n−1c=1 1{Xijc=v2}(
1−∑n−1c=0 θjka(c)ij)2

∂2∂Φjk(θ)
∂θ2jkv1
= −
T∑
i
Nij∑
n
δijnk
−1{Xijn=v1}
θ2jkv1
+
( ∑n−1
c=1 1{Xijc=v1}
1−∑n−1c=0 θjka(c)ij
)2+ 1
bθ2jkv1
.
Satisfying the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions with the remaining equality
constraint yields the update direction ∆θ for θ(s+1) = θ(s) + ∆θ , where
(10) ∆θ = −H−1
(
g − 1T 1H
−1g
1H−11T
)
.
Because the Newton step in Equation 10 uses a quadratic approximation
of the objective function, the proposed ∆θ increment may be ill-sized. If the
step size is too large, the increment may actually lead to a larger value of
the objective function or infeasible updates where θjkv < 0. Thus, we use a
backtracking line search, detailed in Algorithm 3, to ensure that each update
will always increase the lower bound and remain in the feasible set.
Algorithm 3 M-step update for θ: backtracking line search
Require: θjk, ∆θjk, τ0 ∈ (0, 1)
1: s = 0
2: while Any(θjkv + τ
s
0 ∆θj,k < 0) or [ELBO (θjkv + τ
s
0 ∆θjk) < ELBO (θjkv)] do
3: s++
4: end while
5: return τ = τs0
6.4. Algorithm Discussion. For numerical stability, we first solve the
minimization for a small value of b, and then use that solution to initialize
subsequent minimizations with increasingly larger values of b (Nocedal and
Wright, 1999). In addition, if a particular variable has a large number of
options, inverting the Vj × Vj Hessian can become computationally expen-
sive. A quasi-Newton or gradient ascent procedure may require less overall
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computation by avoiding large matrix inversions. We also note that the sub-
routines for α and each θjk can be computed completely in parallel which
may be fruitful if the number of subgroups or variables is large.
As with almost all variational methods, the objective function is multi-
modal, so only convergence to a local maximum is guaranteed. Using avail-
able prior knowledge can be very helpful in determining reasonable initial-
izations for a specific problem; however, multiple initialization points are
recommended to increase the probability of finding the global maximum.
We found empirically that initializing α and θ with the following heuristi-
cally driven two step procedure generally resulted in stationary points with
a larger ELBO. Using a random initialization of θ and α and setting all val-
ues of φ and δ to 1/K, iterate the variational EM procedure until reaching
a stationary point α˜ and θ˜. Then, use the resulting global parameters α˜ and
θ˜ to initialize a second run (with φ and δ reset to 1/K). The result of the
first run is only a stationary point with respect to all the parameters (both
global and individual), so resetting the φ and δ parameters will generally
result in a new stationary point where the global parameters θˆ and αˆ are
different than the intermediate initialization points.
Because the dimension of even just the α and θ parameters can be quite
large, a huge number of random restarts may be needed to explore the space
well when selecting uniformly. We posit that using this two step procedure
to find initialization points concentrates the search in areas where the ELBO
is likely to be larger.
7. Eurobarometer Analysis. We now analyze rank data from the
Eurobarometer 34.1 survey (Reif and Melich, 2001). We removed individuals
with missing data (i.e. anyone who did not respond to all 3 questions of
interest) and individuals who had reported ties in any of their rankings,
leaving 11,872 individuals of the original 12,733.
7.1. Model Selection. Table 1 shows the top 5 observed rankings for each
question. In particular, we observe that the response which ranks the policy
priorities in the exact order of presentation is the most common pattern
for drug priorities and is also the 6th and 28th most common pattern for
alcohol and AIDS. If some individuals used this ordering out of convenience,
the resulting responses may not be informative of true policy preferences.
To capture this tendency, we include a subgroup whose preferences corre-
spond with the presentation-ordered permutation. Following Gormley and
Murphy (2006), we also include a “noise” subgroup whose preferences are
uniform across all policy priorities. We fix the support parameters, θ, for
these groups, but estimate their relative frequencies (the corresponding ele-
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ments of α). This approach is similar to the extended grade of membership
model (Erosheva, Fienberg and Joutard, 2007) which also models specific
response patterns with unusually high counts; however, here we allow for
partial membership in the fixed subgroups, whereas Erosheva, Fienberg and
Joutard (2007) assume that some individuals are full members of the fixed
subgroups.
We use a held out ELBO procedure to select an appropriate number of
subgroups K. We randomly split the sample in half to create a training set
and test set. For each K = 3, 4, . . . 10 (we do not include K = 2 because that
would only be the 2 fixed groups), we first fit a model to the training set
and select global parameters αˆ and θˆ. Then, to compute the held out ELBO
on the test set, we use a single E-step which fits the individual variational
parameters φ and δ for the test set given the αˆ and θˆ from the training
set. We use 40 different initialization points θ0 ∼ Dir({a, a, . . . a}) at each
a = .6, 1.1, and 1.5 and select the stationary point across all K with the
highest resulting held out ELBO. We then used the stationary point selected
by the procedure to initialize a final run with the results presented below.
To ensure that the model interpretation is not dependent on the selected
training/test set, we repeated this procedure with 3 different training/test
splits. For each batch, the held out ELBO values do vary widely within a
fixed K due to the multi-modality of the ELBO. However, we see the same
trend in all 3 cases; the largest held out ELBO values for each K = 3, 4, 5, 6
are somewhat close and peak at either 4 or 5 and the maximum held out
ELBO values decrease rapidly as K increases beyond 6. Of the three batches,
the first batch selects a 5 subgroup model (including the two fixed groups)
and the other two batches select a 4 subgroup model. Figure 3 shows that
the two largest subgroups of the first batch (5 subgroup model) are very
similar in structure to the two non-fixed subgroups of the second and third
batches (4 subgroup models). Since the 5 subgroup model has the largest
ELBO, we describe that model in the remainder of this article.
7.2. Goodness of Fit. To check goodness-of-fit, we generate 1000 simu-
lated data sets using the fitted values αˆ and θˆ. Figure 4 shows that the model
captures the general trend of observed counts for the first place rankings of
each variable. These plots are not quite posterior predictive checks because
α and θ are fixed so the variability of the simulated outcomes is smaller than
if α and θ were also considered random quantities.
7.3. Model Interpretation. Table 3 presents the ratio of the estimates θˆ
and uniform support parameters (ie, θˆjkv/
1
Vj
). Thus, the reported values
represent how many times more likely a full member of a subgroup would
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Fig 3. The estimated support parameters of two largest subgroups of the selected 5 subgroup
model from batch 1 (red squares) is plotted against the estimated support parameters from
batch 2 (green circles) and batch 3 (blue triangles).
Fig 4. 1000 simulated top priority rankings using the fitted αˆ and θˆ values are shown with
the boxplots. The observed counts are indicated by the red x.
be to select a specific policy as their top priority compared to an individual
selecting policies randomly. A value larger than 1 indicates that the policy
is more popular than average for the variable and subgroup, and a value less
than 1 indicates that the policy is less popular than average. The log10 of
these values are also represented in Figure 5 where priorities favored more
than average have a positive bar height and priorities favored less than
average have a negative bar height. Furthermore, within each subgroup,
priorities are sorted by estimated support allowing readers to more easily
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characterize subgroup preferences.
Subgroup 1 generally favors punitive policies. For illegal drugs, the top
two priorities are “Punish dealers” and “Penalize users,” and subgroup 1 is
44 times more likely to select “Punish dealers” than the least favored option
of “Funding research.” Similarly, for alcohol, the most popular policies are
“Stricter penalties for offenses” and “Restricting sale.” Although “Ostra-
cizing alcoholics” is the least popular policy for all subgroups, in subgroup
1, it is only 55 times less likely than the top priority while it is 260 times
less popular than the top option for subgroup 3 and numerically zero for
subgroup 21. For AIDS, although the two punitive options (“Punish behav-
ior” and “Isolate patients”) are the least favored policies, subgroup 1 is only
roughly 3.5 times less likely to select these two options relative to the most
popular option of “Funding research.”
Subgroup 2 generally prioritizes “Information campaigns.” “Information
campaigns” are roughly 1.7 times more likely to be selected as the top prior-
ity than the second most popular option of “Penalizing dealers” and 14 times
more likely than the least popular option “Penalize users.” For alcohol, “In-
formation campaigns” are 4 times more likely than the second most popular
alternative “Rehabilitate alcoholics”. The least popular option is “Penalize
users”, with an estimated support parameter that is numerically zero; the
two other least popular policies include “Increasing taxes” and “Lowering
limits.” The dislike for these options is consistent with the idea of limited
government social intervention. For AIDS, subgroup 2 is the only subgroup
for which “Funding research” is not the most popular option, with “Infor-
mation campaigns” roughly 1.3 times more likely than “Funding research.”
Finally, subgroup 3 typically supports rehabilitation and treatment, as
well as funding research. For illegal drugs, although the most popular policy
is “Treating addicts,” “Punishing dealers” and “Addressing social causes”
are also popular policies. For alcoholism, “Rehabilitation” is by far the most
popular policy with “Funding research” and “Increasing resources for reha-
bilitation” as the only other options with substantial support. For AIDS,
this subgroup expresses strong support for “Treating AIDS” and “Funding
research.”
Broadly speaking, the identified groups are consistent with the typical
Left (liberal) vs Right (conservative) political ideology archetypes. The focus
on punitive measures is consistent with a right leaning approach towards
governance while the focus on information and rehabilitation typifies a more
left leaning approach (Cavadino and Dignan, 2006).
1For alcohol, there are 10 options and at most 5 ranking levels. Thus, it may be possible
for an option to appear extremely infrequently or not at all.
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Table 3
The estimated support parameters divided by the support parameter under uniform
selection. The bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are shown in parentheses.
Subgroup 1 Subgroup 2 Subgroup 3
Punitive Subgroup Info Subgroup Rehab Subgroup
Drug Policy
Inform Public 0.191 (0.175, 0.209) 2.249 (2.17, 2.324) 0.745 (0.694, 0.8)
Punish Dealers 5.719 (5.623, 5.808) 1.338 (1.27, 1.404) 1.411 (1.304, 1.527)
Penalize Users 0.344 (0.316, 0.376) 0.157 (0.147, 0.167) 0.225 (0.204, 0.246)
Treat Addicts 0.162 (0.149, 0.176) 1.103 (1.064, 1.144) 1.456 (1.373, 1.542)
Fund Research 0.132 (0.122, 0.143) 0.489 (0.469, 0.509) 0.966 (0.913, 1.017)
Social Causes 0.251 (0.231, 0.272) 1.197 (1.149, 1.247) 1.386 (1.313, 1.461)
Control Medicine 0.202 (0.186, 0.219) 0.468 (0.449, 0.489) 0.81 (0.767, 0.853)
Alcohol Policy
Inform Public 0.648 (0.609, 0.689) 4.565 (4.421, 4.709) 0.324 (0.296, 0.355)
Penalize Off 4.269 (4.104, 4.432) 0.722 (0.681, 0.767) 0.192 (0.168, 0.218)
Ban Ads 0.85 (0.798, 0.904) 0.744 (0.702, 0.787) 0.104 (0.089, 0.121)
Inc Taxes 0.541 (0.509, 0.576) 0.25 (0.23, 0.271) 0.045 (0.036, 0.055)
Rest Sale 2.086 (1.994, 2.181) 0.7 (0.662, 0.741) 0.391 (0.347, 0.438)
Low Limits 0.472 (0.445, 0.5) 0.243 (0.224, 0.262) 0.134 (0.117, 0.154)
Ostze Alcs 0.074 (0.065, 0.084) 0.00 (0.00, 0.00) 0.022 (0.017, 0.028)
Rehab Alcs 0.535 (0.505, 0.563) 1.128 (1.085, 1.171) 5.194 (5.011, 5.38)
Fund Research 0.27 (0.25, 0.288) 0.787 (0.751, 0.822) 1.788 (1.69, 1.887)
Inc Resources 0.254 (0.234, 0.274) 0.862 (0.825, 0.898) 1.805 (1.718, 1.893)
AIDS Policy
Inform Public 1.026 (0.984, 1.067) 2.314 (2.234, 2.393) 0.646 (0.598, 0.7)
Punish behavior 0.521 (0.495, 0.548) 0.079 (0.072, 0.086) 0.251 (0.228, 0.276)
Isolate Patients 0.537 (0.508, 0.57) 0.072 (0.065, 0.079) 0.199 (0.176, 0.225)
Treat AIDS 1.031 (0.993, 1.068) 0.74 (0.705, 0.775) 1.607 (1.524, 1.685)
Fund Research 1.885 (1.819, 1.951) 1.796 (1.725, 1.869) 2.296 (2.195, 2.4)
Fig 5. Each barplot in the figure shows log10
(
θˆjkv/(1/Vj)
)
so that priorities which are
more likely to be selected than average have a positive bar height and priorities which are
less likely to be selected than average have a negative bar height. The priorities for each
subgroup are reordered vertically by largest estimated support to smallest estimated support.
Note that the bar for “Ostracize Alcoholics” for subgroup 2 has been truncated.
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Shown in Table 4, the small magnitude of αˆ, the Dirichlet membership
parameter, suggests relatively low levels of intra-individual mixing. How-
ever, the modal grade of membership in Figure 6 shows that a quarter of
all individuals still exhibit significant intra-individual mixing. We also see
that the non-trivial relative frequency estimates of the non-informative fixed
groups justify their inclusion in the analysis.
Fig 6. The estimated degree of membership in each individual’s modal subgroup.
Table 4
The estimated α Dirichlet membership parameter and the 95% bootstrapped confidence
intervals. The estimated relative frequency of each subgroup is given by αk∑
k′ α′k
.
αˆ Relative Frequency
Subgroup 1 0.05 (0.048, 0.053) 0.322 (0.314, 0.329)
Subgroup 2 0.048 (0.047, 0.051) 0.31 (0.302, 0.318)
Subgroup 3 0.024 (0.023, 0.026) 0.154 (0.149, 0.16)
Subgroup 4 0.014 (0.013, 0.015) 0.088 (0.084, 0.092)
Subgroup 5 0.02 (0.019, 0.021) 0.126 (0.122, 0.131)
The Dirichlet distribution for λi implicitly enforces negative dependence
between subgroup memberships, although positive dependencies could be
modeled using distributions considered by Blei and Lafferty (2005). How-
ever, the magnitude of correlations between subgroup memberships is still
informative. In Table 5, the estimated membership in the informative sub-
groups is more strongly correlated with membership in the other informative
subgroups (the least negative correlation between subgroups 1-3 is -.29) than
membership in the fixed groups (the most negative correlation between sub-
groups 1-3 vs subgroups 4-5 is -.25). This is not surprising because subgroups
1-3 indicate a particular ideology on public policy, while subgroups 4 and 5
essentially represent the lack of preferences which align with the dominant
subgroups.
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Table 5
Correlation between the estimated subgroup memberships for each subgroup.
Subgroup 1 Subgroup 2 Subgroup 3 Subgroup 4 Subgroup 5
Subgroup 1 1.00 -0.55 -0.29 -0.25 -0.07
Subgroup 2 -0.55 1.00 -0.36 -0.25 -0.18
Subgroup 3 -0.29 -0.36 1.00 -0.16 -0.03
Subgroup 4 -0.25 -0.25 -0.16 1.00 -0.04
Subgroup 5 -0.07 -0.18 -0.03 -0.04 1.00
7.4. Uncertainty Estimates. Because αˆ and θˆ were selected through a
pseudo-MLE procedure, there are no readily available model-based stan-
dard errors; however, we estimate standard errors via an empirical bootstrap
procedure. For each bootstrap sample b = 1, . . . 5000, we select 11,872 indi-
viduals with replacement from the observed sample and use the variational
EM procedure to select pseudo-MLE estimates αˆ(b) and θˆ(b). Each bootstrap
sample run is initialized at the same starting points used for the full model.
This initialization avoids overestimating variability in stationary points due
to multi-modality of the objective function and seeks to only capture sam-
pling variability. To form 95% confidence intervals, we take the .025 and .975
quantiles of the bootstrapped estimates.
7.5. Multivariate vs Univariate Model. We also acknowledge the implicit
decision to use a multivariate model instead of fitting a univariate model for
each question. Under a univariate models, subgroup membership λ for each
individual is estimated independently of the responses to other questions.
By contrast, in a multivariate specification, individuals can still exhibit a
different mix of subgroups across each question and ranking level, but the
posterior estimates are shrunk towards the individual’s overall membership
λi.
As a sensitivity analysis, we fit univariate models for each question. Fewer
subgroups may be necessary when considering a univariate model when com-
pared a multivariate model, but since the univariate models are only used
to validate the structure of subgroups identified with multivariate data, we
fit models with 5 subgroups and do not repeat the model selection proce-
dure. The estimated support parameters θ do not differ substantially from
the multivariate model, but the estimated membership parameters α dif-
fer across univariate models in an informative way. Table 6 shows a much
higher proportion of membership in the information subgroup for the AIDS
univariate model than we see in the drugs univariate, alcohol univariate, or
full multivariate models. This suggests that, on average, individuals have a
stronger preference for “Information campaigns” to address AIDS, which is
not seen as strongly in addressing alcohol or drugs. As expected, the relative
frequencies when averaged across all three univariate models are similar to
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the relative frequencies of the full model.
Table 6
The estimated αˆ and corresponding relative frequency for each of the univariate and full
multivariate models.
Subgroup 1 Subgroup 2 Subgroup 3 Subgroup 4 Subgroup 5
Drug Univariate Est 0.031 0.020 0.015 0.010 0.011
Alcohol Univariate Est 0.062 0.042 0.042 0.021 0.027
AIDS Univariate Est 0.006 0.060 0.018 0.014 0.012
Full Model Est 0.050 0.048 0.024 0.014 0.020
Drug Univariate Rel Freq 0.362 0.229 0.169 0.113 0.128
Alcohol Univariate Rel Freq 0.321 0.217 0.218 0.107 0.138
AIDS Univariate Rel Freq 0.052 0.549 0.160 0.126 0.113
Full Model Rel Freq 0.322 0.310 0.154 0.088 0.126
Average Univariate Relative Frequency 0.259 0.319 0.181 0.115 0.127
7.6. Individual Membership Estimates. We examine two specific individ-
uals that illustrate the richness of description afforded by using a mixed
membership model.
Table 7 shows the observed responses from a 68 year old British male.
For addressing drugs, his responses follow the presentation ranking, but for
alcohol and AIDS, he indicates a preference for research and rehabilitation.
We estimate the membership for this man to be 66% subgroup 3 (Rehab and
Research) and 34% subgroup 5 (Presentation Ordering). Because the mixed
membership framework allows for intra-individual mixing, the rank ordered
response for drug policy is attributed to the non-informative subgroup. This
contrasts with a finite mixture model approach, which would otherwise in-
clude this noisy response for drug policy in the estimates for subgroup 3.
Table 7
Observed Responses from a 68 year old British male.
Drug Policy Alcohol Policy AIDS Policy
Priority 1 Inform Public Fund Research Isolate Patients
Priority 2 Punish Dealers Increase Resources Treat AIDS
Priority 3 Penalize Users Rehabilitate Alcoholics Fund Research
Priority 4 Treat Addicts Ban Advertisements Inform Public
Priority 5 Fund Research Inform Public Punish behavior
Priority 6 Fight Social Causes
Priority 7 Control Medicine
Table 8 shows the responses of a 40 year old Spanish female. Her perspec-
tives on alcohol policy differ drastically from her preferences for drugs and
AIDS. We see that her top policies for drugs and AIDS are highly punitive,
but information campaigns and rehabilitation are preferred for alcoholism.
These different perspectives are captured in the model with an estimated
membership of 63% in subgroup 1 and 37% in subgroup 2.
7.7. Membership by Demographic Subgroup. The broad interpretation of
our results agree with previous studies which have identified demographic
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Table 8
Observed responses from a 40 year old Spanish female.
Drug Policy Alcohol Policy AIDS Policy
Priority 1 Punish Dealers Inform Public Punish behavior
Priority 2 Penalize Users Rehabilitate Alcoholics Isolate Patients
Priority 3 Treat Addicts Restrict Sale Treat AIDS
Priority 4 Inform Public Ban Advertisements Fund Research
Priority 5 Fight Social Causes Increase Resources Inform Public
Priority 6 Control Medicine
Priority 7 Fund Research
characteristics associated with general dispositions toward penal ideology. To
examine these demographic trends clearly, we filter out individuals whose
membership in subgroups 4 and 5 (the non-informative subgroups) is over
50%. This leaves 10,448 of the 11,872 original individuals. We then examine
the conditional membership of the remaining individuals in subgroups 1,2
and 3 (ie, λ˜i =
λi
λ1+λ2+λ3
).
We first examine a self reported measure of Left vs Right political ideol-
ogy. Individuals were asked: “In political matters, people talk of the left or
the right. How would you place your views on this scale?” In the recorded
scale, 1 indicates far left and 10 indicates far right. This is not a perfect
analog since each individual likely responded in reference to their national
definition of “center” whereas the subgroup membership estimated from the
rank data is a global measure. Nonetheless, we see that there is a very sig-
nificant Spearman’s rank-order correlation of .15 (p-value ¡ 2e-16) between
self-reported Left vs Right score from Eurobarometer 34.1 and membership
in the “Punitive subgroup.”
Table 9
Average conditional membership by denomination and regularity of attending religious
services. Regular attendance indicates attending a religious service at least once a week;
irregular attendance indicates attending a religious service less than once a week.
Religion Attendance Subgroup 1 Subgroup 2 Subgroup 3
None NA 0.36 0.45 0.19
Orthodox Irregular 0.21 0.58 0.21
Orthodox Regular 0.30 0.47 0.23
Protestant Irregular 0.40 0.40 0.20
Protestant Regular 0.53 0.31 0.16
Roman Catholic Irregular 0.40 0.39 0.21
Roman Catholic Regular 0.47 0.34 0.18
We also examine the average membership across religious affiliation. Some
speculate that Anglo-Saxon cultures are particularly punitive because of
Protestant religions with strong Calvinistic overtones (Tonry, 2007) or fun-
damentalist beliefs (Grasmick et al., 1992). As shown in Table 2, almost
all individuals in the survey report their religion as either Roman Catholic,
None, Protestant or Orthodox. In addition to denomination, the Eurobarom-
eter also recorded how often an individual attends religious services. We col-
lapse the original categories of “Several times a week” and “Once a week”
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to a single “Regular attendance” category and collapse “Few times a year,”
“Once a Year,” and “Never” into an “Irregular attendance” category. Table 9
shows that those who attend religious services regularly have a much higher
average membership in subgroup 1. Also, Roman Catholics and Protestants
are much more likely to belong to subgroup 1 than individuals who report
no religion or Orthodox Christians. We note that roughly 90% of the in-
dividuals who responded as Orthodox Christians were Greek and roughly
97% of Greek respondents reported their religion as Orthodox Christian-
ity. This confounding may be the cause of the particularly low subgroup 1
membership for Orthodox Christians.
In addition, we examine the average estimated membership across levels
of education. The Eurobarometer asks “How old were you when you finished
full-time education?” The average membership in subgroup 1 (punitive) de-
creases steadily as education increases, a finding that is consistent with pre-
vious research on industrialized countries, including Western Europe (e.g.
Mayhew and Van Kesteren, 2002; Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014).
Table 10
Average conditional membership by “Last age of formal education.”
Last Age of Formal Education Subgroup 1 Subgroup 2 Subgroup 3
16 or Less 0.47 0.33 0.19
17 to 19 0.40 0.40 0.20
20 to 21 0.33 0.48 0.20
22 or older 0.26 0.54 0.20
At the national level, the average memberships are also consistent with
qualitative characterizations of national policy. The United Kingdom and
Ireland have high average memberships in subgroup 1 (punitive), while Den-
mark and France are among a cluster of countries with low average member-
ships in subgroup 1. These findings are generally consistent with previous
research using the International Crime Victimization Surveys, which finds
punitive attitudes in the United Kingdom and Ireland, and non-punitive
attitudes in Denmark and France (e.g. Roberts, 2013). In slight contrast to
that work, we find Belgium to have a relatively high membership in subgroup
1, and the Netherlands to have a relatively low membership.
8. Discussion. In this article, we propose a mixed membership model
for multivariate rank data and develop a variational EM estimation approach
that is a computationally attractive alternative to fully Bayesian estimation
for large scale rank data. Mixed membership models provide valuable in-
sights into latent structure within a heterogeneous population and allow for
a richer description when compared to previous mixture model approaches.
When MCMC is tractable for smaller data sets as in Gormley and Murphy
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Fig 7. The estimated average membership of each country where the non-informative fixed
groups (subgroups 4 and 5) have been marginalized out.
(2009), the results provide direct samples from the posterior. Nevertheless,
the demands placed on human and computer time to conduct such an anal-
ysis can be substantial, and scalability of MCMC methods is poor. Ulti-
mately, a mixed membership analysis of larger data sets necessitate other
approaches. Of course, what actually qualifies as “large scale” or “big data”
is dependent on the complexity of analysis. In rank data, the complexity
quickly grows as the number of variables and alternatives increase.
In addition to the computational gains, the proposed method extends the
method of Gormley and Murphy (2009) to explicitly fit the Dirichlet mem-
bership parameter α. Unless there is strong prior knowledge about subgroup
sizes, this extension can result in better fitting models by directly capturing
from the data differences in the subgroup structure and the level of intra-
group mixing. A direct comparison of both goodness of fit and computational
effort is provided in the supplement (Wang and Erosheva, 2016).
To accommodate multivariate ranked data, our model makes the simplest
assumption that all context indicators Zijn are drawn from the same multi-
nomial distribution governed by a single membership vector λi. An alterna-
tive and more complex model might include an additional layer of hierarchy
between λi and Zijn for each variable j. This would allow context indicators
Zijn from separate variables to be drawn from different distributions, while
still respecting the multivariate structure.
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There are drawbacks, however, to the variational approximation. Because
of the multi-modal objective function, many random restarts should be used.
Prior knowledge can be used to select good initialization points, but finding a
global maximum is not guaranteed. We propose a two-step procedure for ini-
tialization, but addressing multi-modality through stochastic optimization
methods (Bottou, 2010) or placing strong priors on the support parameters
to induce “smoothness” in the ELBO are two natural extensions.
Also, unlike a full Bayesian specification, the variational EM method does
not provide a posterior for the global parameters. Frequentist uncertainty
estimates, however, can still be achieved through a bootstrap procedure, but
each bootstrapped model must be carefully initialized to avoid overestimat-
ing variability. To our knowledge, bootstrapping with variational estimation
has not been previously used in the existing literature.
As with any mixture or mixed membership model, selecting the num-
ber of subgroups is difficult. Our model selection procedure involves cross-
validation of the held-out ELBO. This procedure, however, can be com-
plicated by the multi-modality of the objective function and the selected
model might depend on the specific test and training sets. BIC procedures
are also widely used although the theoretical justification does not hold in
mixed membership models (Airoldi et al., 2015). Alternative approaches in-
clude stability-based measures (Lange et al., 2002), direct goodness-of-fit
measures (Cohen and Mallows, 1983), and non-parametric model extensions
such as those based on Dirichlet processes (Teh et al., 2006).
Analyzing the Eurobarometer 34.1 data, we find three informative policy
preference subgroups as well as substantial support for a uniform ranking
group and a presentation-ordered group. The three informative subgroups
primarily favor punitive policies, information campaigns, and rehabilitation
and research, respectively. When comparing subgroup membership to educa-
tional, religious and national demographic information, we see trends which
generally agree with the existing literature. In particular, fewer years of for-
mal education and more religious participation is generally associated with
more punitive attitudes towards social issues. In addition, at the national
level, average subgroup membership roughly agrees with previous charac-
terizations of national punitive attitudes.
Finally, our analysis has implications for survey development. Because of
a sizable presentation-ordered subgroup in our analysis, we recommend ran-
domizing the presentation of choices when collecting rank data to decrease
bias due to non-informative responses where respondents rank choices by
simply following the presentation order. We also note that the variable with
the largest proportion of presentation-ordered responses is the question re-
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garding illegal drugs which also happens to allow up to 7 rankings, while the
other two questions only allow up to 5 ranking levels. This observation natu-
rally leads to speculation of whether decreasing the number of ranking levels
and cognitive load may ultimately lead to more “informative” responses.
Although our analysis focused on issues within political science, sociology,
and public health, multivariate rank data can elicit and capture a rich rep-
resentation of individual preferences. We believe that the proposed method-
ology will be of broad interest. Psychologists, economists, other social sci-
entists, and marketing professionals who analyze large scale rank data can
rely on the proposed methodology to represent large scale ranked preferences
with realistic models which are still parsimonious and easily interpretable.
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APPENDIX
Derivation of Lower Bound onMarginal Log-Likelihood (ELBO).
The derivation of the lower bound from equation 4 is shown here. The lower bound
is
log [P (X|α, θ)] ≥ EQ (log(p(X,Z,Λ)))− EQ (log(Q(Z,Λ)))
Note that Γ(·) denotes the gamma function, Ψ(·) denotes the digamma func-
tion, and fj denotes the Plackett-Luce mass function of variable j. Xij denotes the
observation of Nij level rankings and a(n)ij indicates the alternative selected by
individual i for variable j at ranking level n. Note that for all multinomial mass
functions shown below, the size = 1.
We consider each piece of the lower bound separately. The log likelihood for the
complete data is
(11)
log [p(X,Z,Λ|α, θ)] = log
 T∏
i
Dir(λi|α) J∏
j
Nij∏
n
mult(Zijn|λi)
 fj (Xij |θ, Zij·)

=
T∑
i
log [Dir(λi|α)] +
T∑
i
J∑
j
Nij∑
n
log [mult (Zijn|λi)]
+
T∑
i
J∑
j
log [fj (Xij |θ, Zij·)]
The expectation of the first term with respect to the variational distribution Q
becomes
(12)
T∑
i
EQ log [Dir(λi|α)] =
T∑
i
Eq
{
log
[
Γ[
∑K
k αk]∏K
k Γ(αk)
K∏
k
λαk−1ik
]}
=
T∑
i
log
[
Γ
(
K∑
k
αk
)]
−
T∑
i
K∑
k
log [Γ(αk)]
+
T∑
i
K∑
k
(αk − 1)Eq {log [λik]}
=
T∑
i
log
[
Γ
(
K∑
k
αk
)]
−
T∑
i
K∑
k
log [Γ (αk)]
+
T∑
i
K∑
k
(αk − 1)
[
Ψ(φik)−Ψ
(
K∑
k
φik
)]
The expectation of the second term with respect to the variational distribution
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Q becomes
(13)
T∑
i
J∑
j
Nijr∑
n
EQ {log mult(zijn|λi)} =
T∑
i
J∑
j
Nij∑
n
EQ
{
log
[
K∏
k
λ
Zijnk
ik
]}
=
T∑
i
J∑
j
Nij∑
n
K∑
k
EQ {Zijnk log(λik)}
=
T∑
i
J∑
j
Nij∑
n
K∑
k
EQ {Zijnk}EQ {log [λi,k]}
=
T∑
i
J∑
j
Nij∑
n
K∑
k
δijnk
[
Ψ (φik)−Ψ
(
K∑
k′
φik′)
)]
The third term is
(14)
T∑
i
J∑
j
EQ {log [f (Xij |θ, Zij·)]}
=
T∑
i
J∑
j
EQ
log
Nij∏
n
 K∏
k
 θjka(n)ij(
1−∑n−1c=0 θjka(c)ij)
Zijnk



=
T∑
i
J∑
j
Nij∑
n
K∑
k
EQ
{
Zijnk
(
log
[
θjka(n)ij
]− log [1− n∑
c=0
θjka(c)ij
])}
=
T∑
i
J∑
j
Nij∑
n
K∑
k
δijnk
(
log
[
θjka(n)ij
]− log [1− n∑
c=0
θjka(c)ij
])
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Now for the second term of the ELBO-
(15)
EQ {log [Q (Z,Λ)]} = EQ
log
 T∏
i
Dir (λi|φi) J∏
j
Nij∏
n
mult (Zijn|δijrn)

= EQ

T∑
i
log [Dir(λi|φi)] +
T∑
i
J∑
j
Nij∑
n
log [mult (Zijn|δijn)]

= EQ
∑
i
log
Γ
(∑K
k φik
)
∏K
k Γ(φk)
K∏
k
λφik−1ik
+ T∑
i
J∑
j
Nij∑
n
log
[
K∏
k
δ
Zijnk
ijnk
]
= EQ
{
T∑
i
log
[
Γ
(
K∑
k
φik
)]
−
T∑
i
K∑
k
log [Γ (φik)]
}
+ EQ

T∑
i
K∑
k
(φik − 1) log [λik] +
T∑
i
J∑
j
Nij∑
n
K∑
k
Zijnk log [δijnk]

=
T∑
i
log
[
Γ
(
K∑
k
φik
)]
−
T∑
i
K∑
k
log [Γ(φik)]
+
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[
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